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Continuations for Comparatives
Todd Snider∗
1 Introduction
In this paper, I continue the project of continuation semantics as carried out especially by Chris
Barker and Chung-chieh Shan (2001–2014, in various permutations) by implementing an analysis
of comparatives using continuations. I focus primarily on Heim’s (2000, 2006) quantificational
analysis, noting also how continuations can be used to implement the non-quantificational approach
of 2002.
Due to space constraints, I presume the reader already has a command of the continuations liter-
ature, including both the general mechanisms and the motivations which underlie the project, as well
as knowledge of comparatives. For a thorough introduction of both continuations and comparatives
which presumes no such familiarity, see Snider 2015.
2 Continuations for Comparatives
In order to present the continuations implementation, I’ll present a traditional quantificational ac-
count, namely that of Heim (2000, 2006). This account is by no means the only account of com-
paratives, of course, but it is a good example of a popular account, and one which relies on LF
movement. Starting with a single example and then increasing in difficulty, I’ll introduce the tradi-
tional account and then explain the corresponding moves we’ll have to make to account for the same
data in a continuations analysis.
2.1 Core Example
For our base example, consider (1).
(1) Mary is six inches taller than Bill is wide.
Heim’s (2000) account gives a sentence like (1) an LF and truth conditions as in (2):
(2) a. [6′′ -er than [wh Bill is t wide]] Mary is t tall
b. MAX(height(m))≥ MAX(width(b))+6′′
The logical form in (2a) involves two LF movements:1 one of the comparative standard, and one
within the comparative standard (which I’m referring to functionally, but which Heim calls the than
clause). We’ll look at each one in turn, introducing the continuation analysis additions as we go.
I’ll show that, using a continuation analysis of the comparative construction, we can derive the same
truth conditions for (1) as Heim does (in 2b) without the need for any movement.
2.1.1 Movement of the Comparative Standard
Adjectives are assumed to (obligatorily) take a degree (of type d) to their left, and then return a
property; the set of individuals (type et) that are that degree tall.2 This applies to absolute adjectives
with both explicit and implicit degree phrases (DegPs).
(3) a. John is tall.
b. John is d tall.
c. John is six feet tall.
∗My thanks to Chris Barker, Miloje Despic, Molly Diesing, Mats Rooth, the Cornell Semantics Group, and
the audience at PLC. All errors are my own.
1Heim (2006) adds a third movement; we’ll return to this in Section 2.2.
2This then includes individuals taller than that degree.
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The bare absolute adjective in (3a) is understood as having a contextually supplied DegP, as in (3b),
while the DegP in (3c) is explicit. To keep this parallel, and in so doing require only one denotation
for each adjective, Heim (2000, 2006) treats adjectives in comparative constructions the same way.
Comparatives, after all, involve a degree-denoting piece: the comparative standard (the than clause).
The comparative standard, then, being a DegP, should be in the same location, giving a sentence like
(4a) a form like (4b).
(4) a. John is taller than six feet.
b. John is [-er than six feet] tall.
This way, the denotation of the adjective tall remains the same: it takes a DegP (of type d) on its
left; this one just happens to be a little bit more complex than the DegPs in (3a) and (3c).
To be more precise, Heim (2000) has the form in (4b) not as the LF of (3c), but as the nearly-
surface form: as she puts it, “In those cases where [the comparative standard] is superficially dis-
continuous, we can attribute this to an (obligatory) superficial extraposition process which does not
feed LF.” (In an endnote, she then explains why extraposition is probably not the right analysis.) The
important thing to note is that under this analysis the degree-denoting comparative standard is in-
terpreted pre-adjectivally, in parallel with other degree phrases. This comparative standard, though,
is of type << d, t >, t > for Heim (2000, 2006), so the entire than phrase must move from this
(pre-surface structure) pre-adjectival position:
“Being of type <dt,t>, these complex DegPs cannot be interpreted in situ, but must move
for interpretability to a position above the adjective’s subject (not necessarily above the
surface subject, if there are lower covert subjects). The movement leaves a trace of type
d and creates a λ -abstract of type <d,t>, which makes a suitable argument to the DegP.”
(Heim 2000:42)
It’s also worth noting here that Heim treats -er as the morpheme containing the comparative operator,
with than being a semantically vacuous phonological reflex on the comparative standard’s DegP. For
more on this assumption, see Snider 2015.
In the framework we’re using, we can retain a single unified denotation form for adjectives
without needing to posit movement (either pre-surface or post-surface). The comparative operator
(-er) combines with the predicate before the predicate takes any arguments, and the comparative
operator can introduce arguments internally within its denotation to the meaning of a predicate in
whichever order it likes; nothing has to move for “interpretability” (type reasons). Our comparative
operator, then, we can define as:
1 ( ( ” e r t h a n ” ( ( d\( e\ t ) ) \ ( ( d\( e\ t ) ) / d ) ) ) ( ˆ A ( ˆ d ( ˆ D ( ˆ e ( max A e >= d + D ) ) ) ) ) )
This is our (new) lexical entry for the comparative operator in the parser associated with the Shan and
Barker 2006 system. On the left is the phonological form (the PF or “spellout” of the morpheme),
followed by the syntactic type (in the Shan and Barker 2006 system these are semantic types (e,
t, and d) along with slashes) and then on the right the semantic denotation (with ^ standing in for
λ ). So, reading through the syntactic type, we can see that erthan first takes an adjective (of type
det, represented as (d\(e\t))) on its left, then combines with a degree (of type d) on its right—
this will be the comparative standard—, returning something also of type det, effectively standing
in place of the original adjective. It then goes on to take on its left a degree (the differential) and
individual that the adjective would have, before returning a truth-evaluable statement (of type t).
The (maximum) degree to the subject has on the scale denoted by the adjective is compared to the
sum of the comparative standard and the differential.
Following Heim (2000:42), the comparative returns a statement which includes the maximum
operator, as defined in (5).
(5) max(P) := ιd.P(d) = 1& ∀d′[P(d′) = 1→ d′ ≤ d] Heim 2000, (6)
max returns the maximum degree from some scale of degrees; this is intended to account for the
notion that if John is six feet tall, then he’s also five feet tall, and four feet tall, etc. Even though
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the scale of height has this property, it’d be false to say that Mary is taller than John, so it must be
that we’re not comparing just any values but the maximum values of each person’s height; for this
reason we need the max operator.
With our comparative operator and Heim’s max, the system can easily handle the comparative
standard’s being located to the right of the adjective as opposed to the left, and can do so without
needing an additional form for adjectives in comparative constructions. We can see just this part in
action if we look at the derivation of a comparative even simpler than (1), something like (6a):
(6) a. John is one inch taller than six feet.
b. MAX {d : tall(john,d)} ≥ 6′ + 1′′ (cf. Heim 2000, (7))
= height(j)≥ 6′+1′′
We should expect (6a) to have truth conditions matching the expression in (6b), and indeed we get
just this sort of result: a full derivation for (6a) is in Figure 1.
1 edge : 235 john i s o n e i n c h t a l l e r t h a n s i x f e e t (0 6 ) t
2 s e m a n t i c s : ( max ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) ) j >= s i x f e e t + o n e i n c h )
3 p r o o f n e t : ( ( 1 . t ) ( j ohn (2 . e ) ) ( i s ( ( ( 2 . e ) \ (1 . t ) ) / ( ( 3 . e ) \ (4 . t ) ) ) ) ( o n e i n c h
d ) ( t a l l ( d \ ( ( 5 . e ) \ (6 . t ) ) ) ) ( e r t h a n ( ( d \ ( ( 5 . e ) \ (6 . t ) ) ) \ ( ( d \ ( ( 3 . e ) \ (4
. t ) ) ) / d ) ) ) ( s i x f e e t d ) )
4 d e r i v a t i o n : ( ( L john ) ( i s ( ( L o n e i n c h ) ( ( t a l l e r t h a n ) s i x f e e t ) ) ) )
5
6 j ohn i s o n e i n c h t a l l e r t h a n s i x f e e t t = ( max ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) ) j >= s i x f e e t +
o n e i n c h )
7 j ohn (1 / ( e \ 1) ) = ( ˆ f ( f j ) )
8 L ( ( 2 / (1 \ 2) ) / 1 ) = ( ˆ x ( ˆ f ( f x ) ) )
9 j ohn e = j
10 i s o n e i n c h t a l l e r t h a n s i x f e e t ( e \ t ) = ( ˆ e (max ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) ) e >= s i x f e e t
+ o n e i n c h ) )
11 i s ( ( e \ t ) / ( e \ t ) ) = ( ˆ k k )
12 o n e i n c h t a l l e r t h a n s i x f e e t ( e \ t ) = ( ˆ e (max ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) ) e >= s i x f e e t
+ o n e i n c h ) )
13 o n e i n c h (1 / ( d \ 1) ) = ( ˆ f ( f o n e i n c h ) )
14 L ( ( 2 / (1 \ 2) ) / 1 ) = ( ˆ x ( ˆ f ( f x ) ) )
15 o n e i n c h d = o n e i n c h
16 t a l l e r t h a n s i x f e e t ( d \ ( e \ t ) ) = ( ˆ D ( ˆ e (max ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) ) e >=
s i x f e e t + D) ) )
17 t a l l e r t h a n ( ( d \ ( e \ t ) ) / d ) = ( ˆ d ( ˆ D ( ˆ e ( max ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) ) e
>= d + D) ) ) )
18 t a l l ( d \ ( e \ t ) ) = ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) )
19 e r t h a n ( ( d \ ( e \ t ) ) \ ( ( d \ ( e \ t ) ) / d ) ) = ( ˆ A ( ˆ d ( ˆ D ( ˆ e ( max A e >= d +
D) ) ) ) )
20 s i x f e e t d = s i x f e e t
Figure 1: A derivation of John is one inch taller than six feet.
There are some comments worth making about this derivation, but first, let me explain what
we’re looking at here. The first line, labeled “edge”, has the input string, namely the sentence in
(6a), as well as its length (4 words) and its output type (t). Line 2, labeled “semantics”, has the
truth conditions of the sentence. (I’ll comment on the contents of this line in a moment.) Line 3,
“proofnet”, describes the internal workings of the parser, whose inner workings are not crucial to
understand right now. On line 4, “derivation”, however, we can see the derivation which leads to
this parse. The parentheses indicate order of operations, the order in which Function Application
has taken place. In this line, L is Lift.
Below that is the derivation itself, step by step. The first line on which any lexical item appears
is its ‘leaf node’, and that line lists (from left to right) its phonological form, syntactic type, and
semantic denotation. Looking at the line 9, for instance, we can see the introduction of John into the
derivation. The phonological form is john, its type is e, and its denotation is the individual (abbre-
viated as) j. Here I recommend reading from the bottom up, just as one might with a derivation tree.
In this particular one, we see the comparative combine with the predicate (tall), then the comparative
standard (six feet),3 then the differential (one inch), and finally the subject (John).
3Represented here as a single lexical entry, sixfeet, just to keep the derivation short. Another grammar
which separates numerals (like six) and measure terms (like feet) exists for any interested readers. That dis-
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The astute reader may have noticed that the truth conditions listed on line 2 don’t match exactly
with the expression in (6b) that we were hoping for. This is a side effect of using max in this parser
as opposed to on paper. The way to read this is as though max, embedded in the denotation of
the comparative, could access the adjective’s measure function, allowing us to make the following
simplification (see full discussion in Snider 2015):
(7) max(λdλx.[height(x)≥ d])( j)≥ 6′+1′′
= λx.[height(x)]( j)≥ 6′+1′′
= height( j)≥ 6′+1′′
And this fully simplified expression is, of course, what we were looking for as in (6b).
Now we’ve got a comparative operator, Heim’s maximum operator (and the means to simplify
it), which is enough to handle the placement of the comparative standard in an example like (4a)
without needing the sort of movement in (4b). The only other thing we’ll need to handle (4a) is a
contextual variable to take the place of the covert differential that must be there. We can call it d,
and if its semantics, the contextual differential it picks out, is handled by an assignment function (or
something akin to one), then we can handle examples like (4a).
2.1.2 Movement within the Comparative Standard
A sentence like (1), repeated here for convenience, unlike (4a), also needs an additional movement
under Heim’s (2000, 2006) analysis.
(1) Mary is six inches taller than Bill is wide.
To understand why, it’ll be useful to take a moment to look at comparative standards as a class.
Comparative standards appear to be able to take a number of different forms, even in a single con-
struction, like that of (1).
(8) a. Mary is taller than [six feet].
b. Mary is taller than [John].
c. Mary is taller than [Bill is (tall)].
Looking at the sentences in (8), we see a variety of things in the than phrase: we see what looks
like a DegP in (8a), what looks like a DP in (8b), and what looks like a CP in (8c). If we consider
the bracketed material in these sentences to be so varied, we’re mising an important generalization
about these comparative standards. In fact, all of these denote a degree, something of type d. And
note further that the sentence-like structure is not truly a full sentence of type t; it’s not just any
such sentence that can fit in this position, and this structure cannot contain an explicit degree in the
pre-adjectival position where one would otherwise put a degree:
(9) * John is taller than Mary is five feet tall.
What is needed, then, is a way to interpret a structure like [Bill is tall] as itself a degree-denoting
phrase.
In the classical account, the degree-ness of these CP-like clauses (and the infelicity of explicit
degrees in them) is handled via wh- movement. As Heim (2000:51) puts it:
“Following standard practice, I take than-clauses to be derived by wh-movement of a covert
operator from the degree-argument position of an adjective. The trace is interpreted as a
variable over degrees. The wh-clause as a whole may be treated in analogy with a free
relative, as a definite description of a maximal degree.
(39) Jwhthe bed is tlongK= max{ d: long(the bed,d)} ”
tinction, however, makes no difference to the computation of the comparative other than to lead to somewhat
longer derivations, and so I’ve simplified things for the purposes of this project.
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Under Heim’s analysis, it’s this wh-movement which allows us to interpret the CP-like structure as
a degree, and it’s the presence of the trace of the covert operator which blocks sentences like (9).
Because our aim is to account for comparatives without this sort of movement, we need to
account for the degree-type nature of the standard, even when it appears to be sentence-like. And,
as this is precisely the part of the derivation that under Heim’s (2000, 2006) account requires wh-
movement, the same sort of movement which is theorized to account for quantifier raising for scope
at LF, it’s this part that we can account for using continuations. Just as quantifiers made use of
continuation-sensitive material which has some local type but which took scope at some other type,
we’ll want something similar for the comparative standards within comparative structures.
To fill this need, I introduce a new covert operator for the pre-adjectival position of comparative
standards, just the same place as Heim’s wh- trace. Because it’s in this pre-adjectival position,
its local type should be d. What we need it to do, however, is to allow us to interpret the sentence-
looking comparative standard as a degree. Translating this need into our continuation type language,
our new operator will take scope over the entire comparative standard (the than phrase) which is of
type t, but it will return something of type d, allowing us to interpret the standard as denoting a
degree. Its definition, then, looks like this:
1 ( ( ” ? d ” ( d / / ( d \\ t ) ) ) ( ˆ k (max k ) ) )
I named the operator ?d so as to invoke the idea of ‘the issue of d’: the (unknown) answer to the
question How d is x?, in our example (1), the degree of Bill’s width (which is unspecified in the
comparative). Reading through the lexical entry, it’s phonologically null (but has a name for the
parser’s sake), and it has the syntactic type d( (d ) t) (read the double slashes as fat slashes): its
local type is d, it takes scope at t, and its return type is d.
Let’s try to understand what’s really going on here. Within our (often elided) comparative
standard, we have a nearly complete sentence: Bill is [ ] wide. It would be a full sentence (of type t)
except that it’s missing a degree phrase (of type d) somewhere specific inside of it. This continuation
is the argument of our scope taker, our new operator, which should return a degree, something of
type d, so its type is (d( (d)t)): an expression which needs a continuation of type d) t surrounding
it in order to return a d.
Unlike the generalized quantifiers Shan and Barker discuss (type t( (e)t)), this operator’s
scope-taking input type (t) does not match its output type (d). This is still kosher in the world
of continuations, following Wadler 1994. See also discussion in Barker and Shan 2014 (Section
18.4).
Turning back to the lexical entry, we can see that semantically, ?d is a max-imized identity
function: it passes the content up, but embeds that content under a max operator. This allows us to
interpret the comparative standard in (1) not just as any old degree of Bill’s width, but the maximal
degree of Bill’s width: in common parlance, Bill’s width.
In action, the comparative standard from our example (1), Bill is wide, as represented in (10),
returns the correct semantics for the embedded degree-denoting sentence-like phrase.
(10) a. ...[Bill is wide].
b. Bill is ?d wide
For a complete derivation tree and parser derivation for (10), see Snider 2015.
With this in hand, we can now turn to the full derivation of our core example (1). The sentence
will have a type tree as in (11):
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(11)
t
e\t
e\t
d\(e\t)
d
d( (t) t)
d( ((e\t))t)
d( ((e\t))t)
t( ((d\(e\t)))t)
d\(e\t)
wide
λdλx.width(x)≥ d
d( (d)t)
?d
λk.MAX(k)
d( (((e\t)/(e\t)))d)
(e\t)/(e\t)
is
λP.P
d( (e)d)
e
Bill
b
(d\(e\t)) / d
(d\(e\t)) \((d\(e\t)) / d)
-er than
λAλdλd′λx.MAX(A,x)≥ d+d′
d\(e\t)
tall
λdλx.height(x)≥ d
d
6′′
(e\t)/(e\t)
is
λP.P
e
Mary
m
Making the entire derivation tree in this format would be quite crowded and hard to read. Instead,
we can see the whole process in the parser’s derivation in Figure 2.
1 edge : 535 mary i s s i x i n c h e s t a l l e r t h a n b i l l i s ? d wide (0 9 ) t
2 s e m a n t i c s : (max ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) ) m>= (max ( ˆ r ( w id th b >= r ) ) ) + s i x i n c h e s )
3 p r o o f n e t : ( ( 1 . t ) ( mary (2 . e ) ) ( i s ( ( ( 2 . e ) \ (1 . t ) ) / ( ( 3 . e ) \ (4 . t ) ) ) ) ( s i x i n c h e s d ) ( t a l l ( d \ ( ( 5 . e ) \ (6 . t ) ) ) )
( e r t h a n ( ( d \ ( ( 5 . e ) \ (6 . t ) ) ) \ ( ( d \ ( ( 3 . e ) \ (4 . t ) ) ) / d ) ) ) ( b i l l (7 . e ) ) ( i s ( ( ( 7 . e ) \ (8 . t ) ) / ( ( 9 . e ) \ (10 .
t ) ) ) ) ( ? d ( d / / ( d \\ (11 . t ) ) ) ) ( wide ( d \ ( ( 9 . e ) \ (10 . t ) ) ) ) )
4 d e r i v a t i o n : ( ( L mary ) ( i s ( ( L s i x i n c h e s ) ( ( t a l l e r t h a n ) (D ( ( S (U ( L b i l l ) ) ) ( ( S (U i s ) ) ( ( S ( ( S (U L ) ) ? d ) ) (U wide ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
5
6 mary i s s i x i n c h e s t a l l e r t h a n b i l l i s ? d wide t = ( max ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) ) m>= (max ( ˆ r ( w id th b >= r ) ) ) + s i x i n c h e s )
7 mary (1 / ( e \ 1) ) = ( ˆ f ( f m) )
8 L ( ( 2 / (1 \ 2) ) / 1 ) = ( ˆ x ( ˆ f ( f x ) ) )
9 mary e = m
10 i s s i x i n c h e s t a l l e r t h a n b i l l i s ? d wide ( e \ t ) = ( ˆ e (max ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) ) e >= (max ( ˆ r ( w id th b >= r ) ) ) +
s i x i n c h e s ) )
11 i s ( ( e \ t ) / ( e \ t ) ) = ( ˆ k k )
12 s i x i n c h e s t a l l e r t h a n b i l l i s ? d wide ( e \ t ) = ( ˆ e (max ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) ) e >= (max ( ˆ r ( w id th b >= r ) ) ) +
s i x i n c h e s ) )
13 s i x i n c h e s (1 / ( d \ 1) ) = ( ˆ f ( f s i x i n c h e s ) )
14 L ( ( 2 / (1 \ 2) ) / 1 ) = ( ˆ x ( ˆ f ( f x ) ) )
15 s i x i n c h e s d = s i x i n c h e s
16 t a l l e r t h a n b i l l i s ? d wide ( d \ ( e \ t ) ) = ( ˆ D ( ˆ e (max ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) ) e >= (max ( ˆ r ( w id th b >= r ) ) ) + D) ) )
17 t a l l e r t h a n ( ( d \ ( e \ t ) ) / d ) = ( ˆ d ( ˆ D ( ˆ e (max ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) ) e >= d + D) ) ) )
18 t a l l ( d \ ( e \ t ) ) = ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( h e i g h t x >= d ) ) )
19 e r t h a n ( ( d \ ( e \ t ) ) \ ( ( d \ ( e \ t ) ) / d ) ) = ( ˆ A ( ˆ d ( ˆ D ( ˆ e ( max A e >= d + D) ) ) ) )
20 b i l l i s ? d wide d = ( max ( ˆ r ( w id th b >= r ) ) )
21 D (1 / (1 / / ( t \\ t ) ) ) = ( ˆ k ( k ( ˆ x x ) ) )
22 b i l l i s ? d wide ( d / / ( t \\ t ) ) = ( ˆ c (max ( ˆ r ( c ( wid th b >= r ) ) ) ) )
23 b i l l ( ( 1 / / (2 \\ 3) ) / (1 / / ( ( e \ 2) \\ 3) ) ) = ( ˆ R ( ˆ c (R ( ˆ r ( c ( r b ) ) ) ) ) )
24 S ( ( ( 4 / / (2 \\ 5) ) / (3 / / (1 \\ 5) ) ) / (4 / / ( ( 2 / 1 ) \\ 3) ) ) = ( ˆ L ( ˆ R ( ˆ c ( L ( ˆ l (R ( ˆ r ( c ( l r ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
25 b i l l (1 / / ( ( 2 / ( e \ 2) ) \\ 1) ) = ( ˆ f ( f ( ˆ f ( f b ) ) ) )
26 U ( ( 2 / / (1 \\ 2) ) / 1 ) = ( ˆ x ( ˆ f ( f x ) ) )
27 b i l l (1 / ( e \ 1) ) = ( ˆ f ( f b ) )
28 L ( ( 2 / (1 \ 2) ) / 1 ) = ( ˆ x ( ˆ f ( f x ) ) )
29 b i l l e = b
30 i s ? d wide ( d / / ( ( e \ t ) \\ t ) ) = ( ˆ c (max ( ˆ r ( c ( ˆ x ( wid th x >= r ) ) ) ) ) )
31 i s ( ( 1 / / ( ( e \ t ) \\ 2) ) / (1 / / ( ( e \ t ) \\ 2) ) ) = ( ˆ R ( ˆ c (R ( ˆ r ( c r ) ) ) ) )
32 S ( ( ( 4 / / (2 \\ 5) ) / (3 / / (1 \\ 5) ) ) / (4 / / ( ( 2 / 1 ) \\ 3) ) ) = ( ˆ L ( ˆ R ( ˆ c ( L ( ˆ l (R ( ˆ r ( c ( l r ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
33 i s (1 / / ( ( ( e \ t ) / ( e \ t ) ) \\ 1) ) = ( ˆ f ( f ( ˆ k k ) ) )
34 U ( ( 2 / / (1 \\ 2) ) / 1 ) = ( ˆ x ( ˆ f ( f x ) ) )
35 i s ( ( e \ t ) / ( e \ t ) ) = ( ˆ k k )
36 ? d wide ( d / / ( ( e \ t ) \\ t ) ) = ( ˆ c (max ( ˆ r ( c ( ˆ x ( wid th x >= r ) ) ) ) ) )
37 ? d ( ( d / / (1 \\ 2) ) / ( t / / ( ( d \ 1) \\ 2) ) ) = ( ˆ R ( ˆ c ( max ( ˆ r (R ( ˆ r1 ( c ( r1 r ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
38 S ( ( ( 4 / / (2 \\ 5) ) / (3 / / (1 \\ 5) ) ) / (4 / / ( ( 2 / 1 ) \\ 3) ) ) = ( ˆ L ( ˆ R ( ˆ c ( L ( ˆ l (R ( ˆ r ( c ( l r ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
39 ? d ( d / / ( ( 1 / ( d \ 1) ) \\ t ) ) = ( ˆ c (max ( ˆ r ( c ( ˆ f ( f r ) ) ) ) ) )
40 RULE ( ( 1 / / ( ( 2 / (3 \ 2) ) \\ 4) ) / (1 / / (3 \\ 4) ) ) = ( ˆ R ( ˆ c (R ( ˆ r ( c ( ˆ f ( f r ) ) ) ) ) ) )
41 S ( ( ( 4 / / (2 \\ 5) ) / (3 / / (1 \\ 5) ) ) / (4 / / ( ( 2 / 1 ) \\ 3) ) ) = ( ˆ L ( ˆ R ( ˆ c ( L ( ˆ l (R ( ˆ r ( c ( l
r ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
42 RULE (1 / / ( ( ( 2 / (3 \ 2) ) / 3 ) \\ 1) ) = ( ˆ f ( f ( ˆ x ( ˆ f ( f x ) ) ) ) )
43 U ( ( 2 / / (1 \\ 2) ) / 1 ) = ( ˆ x ( ˆ f ( f x ) ) )
44 L ( ( 2 / (1 \ 2) ) / 1 ) = ( ˆ x ( ˆ f ( f x ) ) )
45 ? d ( d / / ( d \\ t ) ) = ( ˆ k (max k ) )
46 wide (1 / / ( ( d \ ( e \ t ) ) \\ 1) ) = ( ˆ f ( f ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( wid th x >= d ) ) ) ) )
47 U ( ( 2 / / (1 \\ 2) ) / 1 ) = ( ˆ x ( ˆ f ( f x ) ) )
48 wide ( d \ ( e \ t ) ) = ( ˆ d ( ˆ x ( wid th x >= d ) ) )
Figure 2: A derivation of Mary is six inches taller than Bill is wide.
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For our core example sentence (1), then, we can derive the same truth conditions as Heim’s
(2000) in (2b) without needing either wh- movement within the comparative standard or type-
mismatch movement of the entire comparative standard to widest scope. Instead of the LF as in
(2a) (repeated here), we end up with the much simpler interpretation form in (12).
(2a) [6′′ -er than [wh Bill is t wide]] Mary is t tall HEIM 2000
(12) Mary is 6′′ tall -er than Bill is ?d wide CONTINUATION ANALYSIS
This continuation-analysis form, which is not coincidentally quite close to the surface form, differs
from the surface form only in the presence of our new scoping operator which, though covert, seems
to block the presence of explicit degree phrases. And, building on the work of Shan and Barker
(2006), we can do so in a way that also has further explanatory power regarding preferences for left-
to-right interpretation (but without sacrificing the ability to derive ambiguous alternative readings).
For some additional benefits, including unifying the semantics of variety of shapes of comparatives,
see Snider 2015.
2.2 Quantificational Comparative Standards
The analysis of comparatives met a considerable challenge when attempting to account for sen-
tences with quantificational comparative standards, that is, comparative standards which include a
quantified element, such as (13).
(13) Mary is 6′′ taller than every boy is.
Why should this sort of sentence pose a challenge? First, there is a question of types: The compara-
tive standard in (4a), six feet, is plainly a degree, of type d, and I’ve argued (following the prevailing
opinion in the literature) that the standard Bill is wide, as in (1), should also be interpreted as degree-
denoting. But how can the comparative standard of (13), presuming it’s [every boy is [ ] tall], be
understood as a degree? Unless all of the boys are the exact same height, presumably that standard
should denote a set of degrees (or perhaps a plurality of degrees, or some other complex type), or at
least not a simple type d.
Second, putting type issues aside, there is an issue of scope-taking. Under quantificational
theories (like that of Heim (2000, 2006)), both the comparative standard and the wh variable-over-
degrees within the comparative standard move at LF. And, as is known, sentences with multiple
quantificational elements should exhibit scope ambiguity, with multiple possible scopal configura-
tions of those quantificational elements. In a sentence like (13), then, with multiple quantificational
elements (the quantifier every and the quantificationally-bound degree denoted by the comparative
standard), we should expect there to be multiple possible scopal orderings and thus multiple possible
interpretations.
(13) only has one interpretation available, however. This (single) available interpretation is
clear: for each boy (in the salient set of boys), Mary is taller than that boy. In other words, Mary is
taller than the tallest boy (and every other boy as well). This is the wide-scope universal reading.
(13) Mary is 6′′ taller than every boy is.
1. For every boy x, Mary is taller than the height d of x. ∀>−er4
2. Mary is taller than d, where d is the height that every boy has. *−er > ∀
The other interpretation that we might have otherwise predicted is a bit trickier, but one can imagine
it: there is some height d such that every boy has that height; such that that height is true of the entire
set of boys. Remembering the way these scales are understood to work, the only (maximal) height
that could fit that criterion is the (maximal) height of the shortest boy. The tallest height that all of
the boys share is the highest height of the shortest boy, making this interpretation of (13) equivalent
to that of Mary is 6′′ taller than the shortest boy, which has much weaker truth conditions. Following
4The comparative isn’t actually the thing scoping, but this makes for a shorter more parallel schema than
any other possible label.
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Fleisher (2015b), I’ll call this a MIN reading, as opposed to the MAX reading we seem to obligatorily
get in this case.
To explain this behavior, we need to explain the exceptional wide-scope of the universal quanti-
fier, provide another mechanism for comparative scope-taking, or do something else. Schwarzschild
and Wilkinson (2002) argued forcefully that these sorts of sentences are problematic, showing ad-
ditionally that there was similarly problematic behavior of other elements in than clauses, such as
verbs as modals, which aren’t usually considered to undergo LF movement, which nevertheless
get wide scope readings. Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002) proposed that rather than degrees,
gradable adjectives denote relations between individuals and intervals; compare (14a) and (14b).
(14) a. JtallK= λddλxe.height(x)≥ d DEGREE
b. JtallK= λD<d,t>λxe.height(x) ∈ D INTERVAL
In the degree semantics we were using above, an adjective denotes the ≥ relation between an in-
dividual and the degree they hold on a scale. On an interval semantics, an adjective denotes the
relationship between an individual and a set of degrees. This allows the than clause in (13) to pick
out not a particular degree of height that all boys have, but instead to pick out an interval that con-
tains all of their (maximum) heights. If Mary’s height exceeds this interval (or, really, if the interval
denoted by Mary’s height properly contains this boys’ height interval), then she must be taller than
every boy, including the tallest boy; which gives us the MAX reading we want.
In response to the arguments presented in Schwarzschild and Wilkinson 2002, as well as some
other data about modals, Heim (2006) introduces a new scope-taking operator to her system: Π,
a “point-to-interval” (“p-i”) operator.5 Π turns degree predicates into generalized quantifiers over
degrees: interval predicates. Importantly to Heim’s analysis, though, “the Π-phrase, being a gener-
alized quantifier over degrees, could move up and be interpretable in higher positions”, allowing it
to take non-local scope; this, in turn, allows Heim to account for scopal ambiguities that arise with
modals within than clauses. A comparative standard like (15a) is analyzed as having an LF as (15b)
derived in (15c), interpreted as (15d), and the same for (16).
(15) a. [ Bill is wide ] (cf. Heim 2006, (41))
b. whλ1 [ [Π t ]λ [ Bill is t wide ] ]
c. [ Bill is Πwh wide ]
[Πwh ]λ2 [Bill is t wide ]
whλ1 [ [Π t ]λ [ Bill is t wide ] ]
d. λP<d,t>.Bill’s width ∈ P
(16) a. [ every boy is tall ]
b. whλ1[every boy λ2 [ [Π t ]λ [ t is t tall ] ] ]
c. [ every boy is Πwh tall ]
[Πwh ]λ3 [every boy is t tall ]
every boy λ2 [ [Πwh ]λ3 [ t is t tall ] ]
whλ1[every boy λ2 [ [Π t ]λ [ t is t tall ] ] ]
d. λD.∀x[girl(x)→ height(x) ∈ D ]
In (16b), the quantifier every has wider scope than Π, which gives the MAX reading for (13). When
Π scopes above a comparative-standard-internal quantifier, though, we get the MIN reading.
Whether one prefers handling quantificational comparative standards by moving entirely to
intervals (a` la Schwarzschild and Wilkinson 2002) or by raising degrees to intervals when necessary
(e.g., through the Π operator, a` la Heim 2006), the same can be accomplished in a continuations
analysis which handles this scope-taking without movement. (For more on the comparison between
these approaches, see Snider 2015.)
Accommodating the Schwarzschild and Wilkinson 2002 analysis requires changing the denota-
tions for gradable adjectives to replace entries that denote degrees (as we saw in (14a)) with those
that denote intervals (as in (14b)), as well as replacing the comparative operator and maximality
operator with equivalents that deal with intervals as opposed to degrees (for both, see Schwarzschild
5Heim attributes the idea for this operator and its name to Schwarzschild 2004.
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and Wilkinson 2002:23). Even in this analysis, though, the comparative standard in the than clause
still involves abstraction (now over intervals), as we still need to interpret every boy is tall not as a
denoting a truth value but as denoting an interval (the interval containing the heights of every boy).
We can use the what is basically the same ?d operator defined above, albeit now with Schwarzschild
and Wilkinson’s (2002) µ maximality operator as opposed to Heim’s (2000) max:
(17)
D
D( (t) t)
D( ((t( (t) t))) t)
D( ((t( ((e\t))t)))t)
D( ((e\t))t)
D( ((e\t))t)
t( ((D\(e\t)))t)
(D\(e\t))
tall
λ Iλx.height(x) ∈ I
D( (D)t)
?D
λk.µ(k)
D( (((e\t)/(e\t)))D)
(e\t)/(e\t)
is
λP.P
D( ((t( (e) t)))D)
t( (e) t)
e\t
boy
λx.boy(x)
(t( (e) t))/(e\t)
every
λ fλk.∀x. f x→ kx
The type tree in (17) is as above, only now with D (the type of an interval, a set of degrees) and with
the modified lexical entries for ?D and wide.
To accommodate Heim’s (2006) analysis, we need only introduce a weaker version of the Π
operator, one which simply raises predicates of degrees to predicates of sets of degrees (intervals).
The extra mobility of Π is unnecessary under a continuation implementation: both quantifiers and
our new quantifiers-over-degrees take scope via the same mechanism, continuations, and so can
interact freely without additional mechanisms. The interpretive system has free access to LIFT,
which as we’ve seen can allow different elements to scope over one another, not just those elements
which encode continuation-sensitivity lexically. There is a preference order for such scope-taking,
but this order is not fixed. Two continuation-level functions can combine in either order (the right
over the left only if the right is at a higher continuation level). Unfortunately, this strength is also a
weakness, one shared by Heim’s (2006) account.
The important remaining caveat in the Heim 2006 account is that it relies upon an additional
constraint on the scopal possibilities of Π. Without such a constraint, the flexibility available to the
system in the relative orderings of the quantifier and the quantifier-over-degrees in a sentence like
(13) allows for both the licit wide-scope universal interpretation and the wide-scope degree interpre-
tation which is unattested. Takahashi (2006) named this constraint the Heim-Kennedy constraint,
and its scope, limits, and motivations (including attempts to reduce it to a general economy principle)
have been much discussed in the literature (Takahashi 2006, Lassiter 2012, Mayr and Spector 2012,
Fleisher 2015a, among others). As understood by Alrenga and Kennedy (2014:26), the constraint
stipulates that “If the scope of a quantificational DP contains the trace of a DegP, it also contains
that DegP itself.” This constraint is sufficient to rule out a number of unattested scope combina-
tions that the theory allows to be generated, but it is quite stipulative, in that it is a constraint on a
particular type of phrase (not heads in general, or functional projections in general), and it remains
unclear why it should be that a degree phrase and a quantificational DP should have to stand in this
particular relation to one another.
We can capture the Heim-Kennedy constraint within the continuations framework by imposing
a restriction on the combinatory possibilities of the SCOPE operation. This means adding another
clause to the SCOPE rule which composes continuations. This new criterion would be the only to
make reference in its formulation to the character of the combinants over which SCOPE operates:
the other criteria care about the relations between the combinants (identity and function-argument
compatibility, to be exact), but they don’t make reference to the specific types of those combinants.
The type-sensitive nature of this restriction, however, may not be unique to the Heim-Kennedy
constraint, in that there may be other phenomena which require SCOPE to be sensitive to particular
264 TODD SNIDER
phrase types, as Charlow (2015) has argued for the wide scoping of indefinites.
The elimination or at least explanation of this constraint continues to elude the field. In the
meantime, we can represent it formally within the continuation semantics framework.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, I have adopted and introduced the work on continuations in natural language by Barker
and Shan and extended their project to comparatives, which have often been analyzed as involving
post-surface movement to LF for type-interpretability reasons. I’ve shown that the formalism de-
scribed by Barker and Shan is capable of handling the difficulties posed by comparatives when sup-
plemented by a few continuation-sensitive operators which I introduced. This is the case whether one
prefers a theory of comparatives that is quantificational (Heim 2000, 2006) or not (Schwarzschild
and Wilkinson 2002), based on intervals or degrees, as demonstrated here. For additional extensions
of this work, discussing the non-upward entailing differentials highlighted by Fleisher (2015b), the
relationship between the comparative and the superlative, and cross-linguistic variation, all as they
relate to a continuation semantics analysis, see Snider 2015.
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